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Throughout my career as a health economist, one issue has
always been a mystery to me—why does cancer enjoy such
a dominant position within healthcare systems throughout
the world?
The debate concerning the reconfiguration of the Cancer
Drugs Fund (CDF), which is addressed in this journal [1],
represents a microcosm of a much wider debate reflecting
the complex and ever-changing interface between political
expediency and clinical rationality within health services
internationally. Within the UK National Health Service
(NHS), the CDF has been the subject of controversy since
its inception because it creates a ‘backdoor’ to healthcare
funding that circumvents health technology assessment
(HTA) programmes in the UK and is only available for
cancer drugs. The existence of a more favourable funding
mechanism solely dedicated to extending the use of cancer
drugs (irrespective of their clinical and cost effectiveness)
represents a major health policy issue as it introduces
significant inequalities into a UK system that was founded
on the premise of providing equal access to patients in
equal need. The very existence of the CDF is contrary to
this founding principle as it creates a two-tier definition of
‘need’—one for cancer and one for patients from every
other therapeutic area. Such a fundamental realignment of
health service principles in favour of cancer patients
inevitably imposes significant ethical, economic and health
implications as a direct consequence of this inequity, which
is now built into the funding basis of the NHS.
It is important to acknowledge that the funding of any
individual drug may be justified by a range of factors
beyond its cost effectiveness, such as considerations of
unmet clinical need, innovation or equity. Such factors are
already considered on an individual basis as an integral part
of the UK National Institute for Health and Care Excel-
lence (NICE) appraisal process, and it is difficult to com-
prehend why such factors should be of particular relevance
in the case of cancer drugs. However, surely society should
be able to prioritise its structure of healthcare provision in
whatever manner it wishes, and if ‘society’ makes an
informed judgement that it wishes to ‘overfund’ treatments
for cancer, then so be it!
Although this may be a realistic representation of the
political reality, I remain unconvinced that ‘society’ is truly
aware of the opportunity cost imposed on non-oncology
patients as a direct consequence of the CDF and similar
‘onco-favouring’ policies. It is important to continuously
remind ourselves and others of one key fact: the very
existence of a more generous funding stream for cancer
drugs inherently takes us into a ‘second best’ world, which
is an affront to our commitment as health economists to the
concepts of both efficiency and equity.
To return to our Panglossian vision of the ‘best of all
possible worlds’ would simply require the additional NHS
funding allocated to the CDF to be made accessible to all
therapeutic areas. This would ensure that such resources
would be allocated purely on the basis of incremental
patient benefit rather than therapeutic favouritism.
In this regard, I must admit that one further fact mys-
tifies me. I fail to understand the apparent unwillingness of
clinicians from other therapeutic areas to effectively
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challenge the unduly privileged funding position enjoyed
by oncology. This would help to overcome the inherent
disadvantage their patients inevitably suffer as a conse-
quence of the failure to achieve a level playing field in
terms of healthcare funding. Such disadvantage is epito-
mised by the very existence of the CDF, the sole objective
of which is to fund cancer drugs that are either unevaluated
or that (perhaps even worse) have been evaluated and
found to not meet thresholds expected of non-cancer drugs
in terms of their clinical and cost effectiveness. It appears
that we afford cancer funding a special status that is not
shared by heart, liver, lung or kidney patients (to name but
a few). If this is the case, then optimising healthcare
decision making subject to this constraint requires us to
identify the health ‘exchange rate’ between cancer and
other therapeutic areas. As a society, are we willing to let
one, five or ten patients suffer death and disability to pre-
vent (or more likely slightly delay) a death from cancer?
One of the guiding principles underlying the formation of
the NHS was that of ‘equal access for equal need’. Therefore,
as a former member of a NICE appraisal committee, I was
aware that our decision making was guided by two princi-
ples: standardisation and comparability. We perceived our
role as ensuring that, wherever possible, resources were
allocated in a manner that optimised the health of the UK
population. In attempting to achieve this, the committee was
acutely aware that in choosing to allocate resources to any
new intervention there was a risk that funding may conse-
quently have to be withdrawn from an existing service that
may have been of perhaps greater value. The controversies
surrounding the nature and level at which quality-adjusted
life-year (QALY) thresholds should be set [2–5] speak elo-
quently to the difficulties involved in making such decisions.
However, I found two principles invaluable. First, continu-
ous reference to the founding principle of the NHS (equal
access for patients in equal need) enabled decisions to be
made on the basis of science and evidence rather than
political expediency and populism. Second, the concept of
opportunity cost emphasised the need to ‘make visible’
patients from the services that would have to forego funding
if we chose to support this treatment. Having been inculcated
in evaluating drugs from such a perspective, the concept of
funding drugs that have failed to prove their value on a level
playing field compared with drugs from other therapeutic
areas seems to be an anathema. In cases where non-onco-
logical drugs exceed the NICE threshold, their only option if
they are to gain access to the NHS is to offer a ‘risk-sharing
scheme’ (i.e. a price discount) until their cost becomes more
commensurate with their clinical benefits. In the case of the
CDF, the NHS bears all the risk while the sponsor accepts all
the benefits. If the sponsor truly believed in the ‘value’
provided by their drug (and that the evidence was not yet
sufficiently available), surely they could simply offer a
discount that would achieve market access (at the normal
threshold value) during this interim period while this
enhanced evidence set was being generated.
The starting point for resource-allocation decisions
should be that drugs that generate equal population health
(in terms of their capacity to enhance the quantity or
quality of a patient’s life) should be valued equally. Any
move away from this principle inevitably reduces the
capacity of the health system to maximise population
health and should only be contemplated if there is
unambiguous evidence of a clear value judgement on
behalf of society that health benefits generated in one
particular therapeutic area are ‘worth’ far more than
health benefits delivered to patients with ‘less worthy’
conditions. Where is this clear and unambiguous evidence
that cancer patients are perceived as being more deserving
of funds than those from other therapeutic areas? This is
the obvious implication of a ‘two-speed’ system of
funding that diverts funds away from conditions where
they could generate greater health gain to cancer treat-
ments, where they knowingly generate less. The greater
this disparity, the greater the health losses suffered by
patients in other therapeutic areas as a direct consequence
of such a two-tier system.
Finally, please do not misinterpret this editorial as being
in any way ‘anti-cancer’. Rather, it is a respectful
acknowledgement of the effectiveness with which every
element within the cancer health system advocates on
behalf of their patients. That is their role, and they perform
it with a rigour that perhaps holds lessons for health pro-
fessionals from other therapeutic areas. Therefore, this
editorial represents a plaintive plea for an answer to a
simple question—why do we as a society appear to per-
ceive the suffering and death experienced by patients from
every other therapeutic as being of so little value?
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